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Respondent
Reading

Stephen

(hereinafter

G. Morgan
"Morgan")/

and

Morgan, Scalley &

hereby

responds

to

Appellants1 Petition for Rehearing:

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS CODRT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
PROBATE HEARING WAS CONDUCTED IN A
JURIS PRUDENTIAL MANNER
The Appellants (hereinafter "the Atkinsons") claim, that
Judge

Fishier

did

not

properly

perform

his

duties

approving the settlement agreement, is without merit.

in
The

Atkinsons provide no proposal as to what they claim Judge
Fishier should have done.

Having reviewed the settlement

agreement, the pleadings and documents submitted to him, and
having questioned the Atkinsons, Judge Fishier made a proper
judicial determination that the rights of the minor child
were adequately protected and in fact, ordered the Atkinsons
to post a bond to ensure that the minor child would be
fairly treated.
The

Atkinsons' claim

of

Judge Fishier is without merit.

-1-

judicial

misconduct

against

POINT II
THIS COORT DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT GRANTED TO MORGAN
The Atkinsons claim

that

"fact issues abound" as to

whether or not Morgan was their lawyer.
called disputed
trial

court

However, the so

"facts" have been considered both by the

and

by

this Supreme Court

and

found

to be

insufficient to create a "genuine controversy"
See Heglar

Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 69 P.2d

1390

(Utah

1980) .
The only
continued

"facts" presented

claim

lawyer.

As

that
has

they
been

by the

understood
previously

Atkinsons

is the

Morgan to be their
shown

in

Morgan's

Respondents1 Brief, during oral argument, and by the opinion
of this court, such a claim by the Atkinsons flies in the
face of all the facts and evidence to the contrary.
Further,
represented

the
by

Atkinsons

Morgan

in

admit
their

that
Petition

they
for

stating :
...the trial court judge relied upon
the evaluation of a 19-year old
boy...and his 16 year old wife.
(Both of whom were unrepresented by
counsel.) (emphasis added)
(Petition for Rehearing, p. 3).
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were

not

Rehearing

This respondent respectfully submits that should this
court

allow

the Atkinsons1

claim of malpractice

against

Morgan to proceed, it would be difficult if not impossible
for an

attorney

in Utah

to safely

deal

with a pro se

opposing party without the danger of facing the same claims
that the Atkinsons are making.
The crux of the Atkinsons' request to this court is to
find that all a disgruntled pro se party has to do is to
assert, "we thought he was our lawyer", and regardless of
how illogical such a claim would be under the circumstances,
and no matter if all the evidence is to the contrary, such a
claim should nevertheless go to a jury.
It is a fact of legal practice that lawyers must, at
times, deal with pro se parties.
herein, require meetings with

This will, as occurred

a pro se party, reviewing

documents with a pro se party, and appearing in court at the
same time as a pro se party.

These actions do not create a

"lawyer-client" relationship.
As

to

Atkinsons1

the

case

law

constitutional

cited

in

connection

claims, the

citations

with

the

are not

relevant for the reason that there are no material facts
that are in dispute or genuinely controverted.

Further, the

Atkinsons1 constitutional claims are raised for the first

-3-

time in this Petition for Rehearing and thus, even if they
had merit, are raised untimely.

A
THERE ARE NO GENOINE ISSUES OF
FACT IN DISPUTE
The

Atkinsons'

claim

to

"evidence" of disputed issues.

provide

this

court

with

However, the Atkinsons cite

only the same statements the Atkinsons made after filing
suit, to the effect that they understood Morgan to be their
lawyer,

which

statements

are

directly

contrary

to

the

evidence.
This court held in Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah
1979)

that

a

defendant

cannot

rely

merely

upon

her

allegations to avoid summary judgment but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.

This the Atkinsons have failed to do.

Further, it is important to note that even VE^ a genuine
fact

issue existed

Atkinsons1

lawyer,

as to whether or not Morgan was the
summary

judgment

was

still

correctly

granted by the trial court because the Atkinsons failed to
provide any evidence by expert testimony or otherwise that
any action on the part of Morgan violated the applicable
standard of care.
in

the

record,

Also, there is no testimony or evidence
expert

or

otherwise,
-4-

on

the

issue

of

causation.

There is no causation between the actions of

Morgan and the alleged damages of the Atkinsons.
damages claimed

The only

are the "inadequate settlement", and the

terms and conditions of the settlement were agreed upon by
the Atkinsons and

I.H.C. prior to the time of Morgan's

involvement.
In Abdul Kadir v. Western Pacific Railroad, 7 Utah 2d 53
318 P.2d 339 (Utah 1957) this court held:
We are in accord with the idea that
the right of trial by jury should be
scrupulously safeguarded.
This of
course does not go so far as to
require the submission to a jury of
issues of fact merely because they
are disputed.
If they would not
establish
a
basis
upon
which
plaintiff could recover, no matter
how they were resolved, it would be
useless to consume time, effort, and
expense in trying them, the saving
of which is the very purpose of
summary judgment procedure.
318 P.2d at 341.
The Atkinsons' request for a rehearing based on disputed
"facts" is without merit and should be denied.

B
THE ATKINSONS RELIED ON THEIR OWN JUDGMENT
AS TO THE FAIRNESS OF THE SETTLEMENT,
The Atkinsons claim that they relied on the judgment of
Judge

Fishier

as to the fairness of the settlement and

therefore, take issue with this court's opinion that they
Atkinsons did not rely on the probate judge.
It should first be noted that the Atkinsons' argument
presupposes that Judge Fishier was in error and that the
settlement agreement was inadequate or unfair.

There is

nothing in the record to support such a supposition.

The

basis of the settlement agreement was that the Atkinsons'
child was injured while in the care of a hospital operated
by I.H.C.

A dispute existed as to whether or not the injury

was caused by any negligence of the hospital or health care
providers.
between

To resolve this disputef negotiations took place

I.H.C.

and

the

Atkinsons.

The

Atkinsons

were

assisted in their negotiations by George Atkinson, a union
negotiator
proposal

at

Kennecott.

prepared

sophisticated
settlement

by

ten

was

In

response

to

a

I.H.C, George Atkinson

page

reached

counterproposal.
which

adequate by all the parties.

was

settlement
prepared a

Eventually

considered

fair

a
and

(R. 156, 269-270, 651, pp. 20-

26, R. 644, p. 115).
Judge
questioned

Fishier
the

carefully

Atkinsons

and

settlement.
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reviewed
thereafter

the

documents,

approved

the

The Atkinsons' statements
findings

of

Judge

Fishier

as to the reliance on the

as

a

basis

for

granting

a

rehearing is without merit.

C
The Atkinsons' arguments as to whether or not they were
mislead

about the settlement

addresses matters

involving

I.H.C. and not this respondent.

D
MORGAN DID NOT PROVIDE "LEGAL ADVICE*
TO THE ATKINSONS
This court correctly stated that "Morgan's explanation
of the probate proceedings, when viewed in the concept of
this

case, did

not

constitute

the

rendering

of

legal

advice."
Morgan was retained by I.H.C. to prepare the relevant
settlement documents on behalf of I.H.C. to present to the
probate

court.

If the Atkinsons

counsel, Morgan would

had

chosen

to obtain

have met with opposing counsel to

review the documents and to ensure their approval by the
opposing

party,

opposing counsel.

and

would

have

appeared

in

court

with

However, the Atkinsons did not have an

attorney and Morgan had no choice but to meet with them to
review the relevant documents and appear at the same time as
-7-

the Atkinsons before the probate judge.
not

make

Morgan

the

Atkinsons1

These actions did

lawyer

and

constitute the provision of "legal advice".

does

not

Morgan merely

made statements of fact as to what the documents were and
the fact that court approval was necessary.
The Atkinsons claim that a "jury may infer that the
Atkinsons

thought

they

were

getting

legal

advice."

(Petition for Rehearing, p. 15). These speculations do not
change the facts.
rendering

The Atkinsons' arguments as to Morgan

"legal advice" are without merit and should be

rejected.

E
THE ATKINSONS CONSULTED WITH AN ATTORNEY
AND CHOSE NOT TO OBTAIN LEGAL COUNSEL
The Atkinsons take issue with the court's findings that
"the Atkinsons... apparently did discuss a settlement with an
attorney

of

their

choosing."

However,

the

admitted the same to Judge Fishier in open court:
THE COURT:

And your name, Sir?

MR. ATKINSON:

Roger W. Atkinson.

THE COURT:
Have you sought the
advice of legal counsel in this
matter?

-8-

Atkinsons

MRS. ATKINSON: I have talked with
someone about it but we are not
planning on getting a lawyer.
THE COURT:
lawyer?

Have you talked to a

MRS. ATKINSON: Yesf I have just
asked him a few things about it, and
he said we really should not — we
shouldn't have to sue them if they
are giving us an offer.
As

this court

correctly

stated

in

its opinion, the

above-cited statements clearly show that the Atkinsons did
not

consider

Morgan

to

be

their

lawyer,

that

these

statements do not refer to Morgan and that the Atkinsons had
consulted with an attorney and decided

not to retain an

attorney on the advice of that lawyer, (who presumably told
them that they wouldn't have to sue if they are being given
an offer).
Morgan, in discussing this statement of Mrs. Atkinson
testified in his deposition:
A:

...I assume by that statement
she had talked
to another
lawyer because I never made
that statement to her.

Q:

Did you ever ask Mrs. Atkinson
what
she
meant
by
that
statement which you just read
to me?

A:

No.

Q:

And you say that you never told
her that she shouldn't sue them
because they made an offer?
-9-

A:

Absolutely not. That is a ridiculous statement.

(R. 652, pp. 45-46).
The Atkinsons now claiming that they were referring to
Morgan when making

these statements concerning a lawyer,

flies in the face of logic and makes no sense under the
circumstances.

The Atkinsons1 attempts to explain away the

obvious are without merit and do not constitute sufficient
reason to grant their Petition for Rehearing.

POINT III
MORGAN DID NOT HAVE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The Atkinsons1 statement in their Petition for Rehearing
that: "even if there was no attorney/client relationship,
Morgan

still had a duty to advise the Atkinsons of his

conflict of interest" is a paradox.

As has been previously

briefed, no attorney/client relationship existed between the
Atkinsons and Morgan.

The Atkinsons1 claim of a "conflict

of interest" is solely based on the following statements by
Roger Atkinson:
Q: You didn't ever ask him [Morgan]
if this is a good or bad deal isn't
that true?
A:

I think not.
him that.

Q:

What did he say?
-10-

I think I did ask

A:

I don't recall.
I think he
asked us back Tf we thought it
was fair. (emphasis added)

(R. 644, pp. 118-119).
First,

Mr.

Atkinson

was

conversation ever took place.

not

certain

that

the

He also did not recall what

Morgan's response was but merely stated that he "thought"
Morgan asked the Atkinsons if they thought it was fair.
Even if the conversation took place as the Atkinsons
"thought", it may have taken place, the Atkinsons admit that
Morgan did not provide any opinion on the fairness of the
settlement.

In fact, Morgan could not have given such an

opinion since he was at no time aware of the details of the
injuries

or

settlement.

the

negotiations

that

resulted

in

the

Morgan had no basis upon which to evaluate or

judge the fairness of the settlement nor was it his duty to
do so.
The

Atkinsons'

reliance

Henriksen is also misplaced.
not timely and

properly

on

an

affidavit

of

Richard

The affidavit in question was

filed, and did not specifically

address the matters at issue.

The affidavit merely dealt in

generalities and hypotheticals, none of which applied to or
referred to Morgan or the factual issues before the trial
court.

-11-

Morgan did not have a conflict of interest.

Morgan was

at no time the Atkinsons1 attorney nor did he at any time
offer legal advice to the Atkinsons or provide an opinion as
to the adequacy or fairness of the settlement.
Finally, under the circumstances it would have made no
sense for Morgan to advise the Atkinsons to obtain counsel.
It was clear by the facts presented to Morgan, that they had
chosen not to do so.
Petition

for

For the Atkinsons to allege in their

Rehearing

that

"if

Morgan

Atkinsons to obtain an independent

had

advised

the

attorney, there would

have been another ending to this story" is without merit
and should be rejected as a basis for granting the Petition
for Rehearing.
POINT IV
THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD KING IS IMPROPER

Finally,

it

should

be

noted

that

the

Affidavit

of

Richard King filed in support of the Petition for Rehearing
is improper.

The Affidavit attempts to raise issues, not

only for the first time on Appeal, but for the first time on
Petition for Rehearing.
provide

relevant

appears

to be

or

Further, the Affidavit does not

useful

saying

information.

is that

What

the Atkinsons

Dr. King

have

found

themselves trying to explain away previous statements, such

-12-

as their statements before Judge Fishier, in an attempt to
fit the claims they are now making against Morgan, and that
after reviewing the inconsistent and illogical explanations
of the Atkinsons, Dr. King has reached the conclusion that
perhaps

they were or perhaps

they were not telling the

truth.
Furthermore, this Affidavit is based on assumptions and
suppositions made by Dr. King.

Finally, if this Affidavit

is viewed in whole or in part as an attempt by Dr. King, a
psychologist, to testify as to the standard of care or of
the actions of Morgan in the field of law, to that extent
the Affidavit is further improper and inadmissible pursuant
to this court's holding in Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d
245 (Utah 1985).

The Affidavit of Richard King should be

rejected as a basis for granting the Petition for Rehearing.
CONCLUSION
Morgan was retained by I.H.C. to provide legal services
to I.H.C. specifically to draft documents in connection with
a settlement agreement and present them to the probate court
for approval.

No attorney/client relationship existed at

any time between Morgan and the Atkinsons, either express or
implied.

Morgan did not provide any legal services or give

legal advice as a volunteer or otherwise to the Atkinsons.
All

of

Morgan's

legal

services

-13-

were

performed

for

the

benefit and on behalf of I.H.C. as reflected on all of the
pleadings and documents.
Judge Fishier verified with the Atkinsons that they were
not represented by counsel, that they had consulted with an
attorney,

not

counsel.

Judge Fishier

settlement.

Morgan,

and

had

acted

chosen

properly

not

to

obtain

in approving the

At no time has there been any evidence that the

settlement was inadequate.
The Atkinsons have utterly failed to show the existence
of any of
claim.

the required

elements of a legal malpractice

Even if a question of fact did exist as to whether

or not Morgan was their lawyer, at no time has there been
any evidence presented by expert testimony or otherwise that
Morgan acted below the standard of care.
agreement

which

is

the

subject

of

this

The settlement
lawsuit

was

completely agreed upon by the Atkinsons and I.H.C. prior to
Morgan's involvement.

There is no causation between any act

of Morgan and the only claim of damages by the Atkinsons,
specifically the terms of the settlement agreement.
The Atkinsons' Petition for Rehearing is without merit
and this respondent respectfully requests that the same be
denied.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
IHC Hospitals, Inc., a/k/a Intermountain Health Care
("IHC") opposes the petition for rehearing.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Petition for Rehearing and of the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j); see also Rule 35, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
FACTS
Roger Atkinson and Polly Atkinson, individually and
as guardians ad litem for Chad Atkinson (collectively, the
"Atkinsons"), alleged (1) that the settlement of approximately
$1 million for Chad Atkinson, approved more than four years
before the Atkinsons brought this suit, should be reopened or
reconsidered and (2) for alleged attorney malpractice (see
Record ["R."] 415-18).

The trial court granted summary judg-

ment, and this Court unanimously affirmed.

Atkinson v. IHC

Hospitals, 138 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (S.Ct. 1990).
ARGUMENT
I.

NO ERROR OF LAW HAS BEEN MADE;
NO ERROR WILL BE REPEATED,

Quoting limited portions of this Court's opinion, the
Atkinsons assert that this Court has overlooked the mandate of
the Legislature that a court must "determine[]" that a transaction is in the best interests of the protected person.
Code Ann. § 75-5-409(2).

Utah

Careful review of the probate court

opinion, this Court's opinion, the statute and the transcript
of the proceedings of the probate court2 reveals no error.
The probate court had the text of the settlement
terms and release available to review

and the parents to ques-

tion about their understanding of the terms.
was adequately and properly apprised.

The probate court

Even the Atkinsons1

partial quotation, with significant ellipses, from this Court's
opinion does not impose new standards or shirk from statutory
responsibilities.

There is no error of law which may be

repeated to the detriment of "hundreds" of future litigants.
After quoting 42 Am. Jur.2d Infants, § 154 (1969) and
referring to Kansas and Tennessee cases4 about evaluating
settlements of infants' claims, the only "evidence" which the
Atkinsons quote to try to demonstrate that the probate proceedings were inadequate is one question addressed to Judge Fishier at his deposition.

He answered that he did not evaluate

the underlying claim against IHC.

(Fishier Dep. at 51.)

A copy of the probate court's decision is attached as
Addendum F to the brief on appeal of Respondents Morgan and
Morgan, Scally & Reading (the "Morgan Brief").
2

See Transcript of Settlement, Fishier, J., July 22,
1983 ("Tr.") attached as Addendum A to Morgan Brief.
3

Addenda C, D and K to Morgan Brief.

4

Western Life Ins. Co. v. Nanneyr 290 F.Supp. 687 (CD.
Tenn 1968); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Lasca, 99 P. 616 (Kan.
1909).
Petitioners also refer to Perrv v. Umbercrer, 65 P.2d
280 (Kan. 1909).
2

Neither Am.Jur.2d nor the cited cases require an
evaluation of the underlying claim —

this supposed requirement

is imposed only by the Atkinsons in their argument.

The

factors enumerated by the cited authorities were all wellcovered by Judge Fishier's review of the nature of the injury
(brain damage), the amount recovered ($900,000 [guaranteed]5),
the fact that both Mr. and Mrs. Atkinson believed the child had
a claim against IHC, their understanding that they could not
sue IHC again regardless of changes in the child's condition
and the terms and conditions of the settlement and recovery,
which provided, in part, that the child's injuries "are or may
be permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is
uncertain and indefinite. . . . "

(Addendum C to Morgan Brief.)

The probate judge was entitled to consider whether
the parents thought the settlement reasonable in making his own
determination, but that is not, as the Atkinsons imply, the
only thing he considered.

The judge was also entitled to

impose conditions for the child's interests —

which he did by

requiring the parents to be bonded and to submit annual
reports.

Judge Fishier stated in his affidavit:
Among other things the Court verified with
the parents that they did not intend to
obtain an attorney and that they had con-

5

The settlement guarantees $900,000 plus certain free
medical care for the child. If the child lives to age 65, the
settlement will be worth at least $1.28 million. IHC has
complied with the settlement requirements and has made and
continues to make timely payments.
3

suited with an outside lawyer, (see page 2
of the transcript, lines 7 thru 14 [sic].)
7. The affiant ascertained that both parents desired to complete the settlement as
they had agreed with Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., and that they felt that it was
in the best interest of the child and themselves, and that upon hearing their testimony, the Court concluded that it was in
the interest of the minor and the parents
to complete the settlement terms which had
been agreed between the parties.
Fishier Affidavit, Addendum P to Morgan Brief, emphasis added.
Moreover, the Petition for Appointment of Conservator
and Order to Approve Settlement recited that the "child sustained accidental injuries while in the care" of an IHC hospital and that the injuries from a plugged breathing tube
"involved brain damage, to an extent which has not been ascertained at this time. . . . "

(Addendum B to Morgan Brief.)

Judge Fishier had ample information before him.
Nothing in the proceedings deprived the child of the
benefit of some $900,000 for his brain damage, free medical
care (which has been extensive), funds for education.
parents also received money.

The

Every reasonable precaution was

taken to assure that the funds would be used for the child in
accord with the structured settlement.
It is the Atkinsons who err by trying to assert that
approval was granted without, for example, consideration of the
settlement agreement and release, which they brought to the

4

probate court.

As this Court correctly concluded, everything

was done in a jurisprudential manner.
II.
1*

THE PETITIONERS1 CONTENTIONS AND
ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT.

The Parents1 Age Is Irrelevant.
The Atkinsons claim that their age and recently

alleged illiteracy at the time the settlement was approved
require new proceedings.

Mr. Atkinson, the father, was then

19, having reached his majority.

He was legally competent to

vote, to enlist in the military, to marry and to have left
compulsory schooling.
to support him.

His parents no longer had any obligation

He was old enough to be appointed as the

guardian of his child and to be trusted to manage, together
with his wife, approximately $1 million in benefits and payments for his child.

He had a tenth-grade education but now

asserts, without proof, that he was barely able to read.

The

law imposes no literacy test on marrying, on fathering, or on
parenting.7

See, inter alia, United States Constitution, Amendment
XXVI, Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78-45-3.
7

The Court specifically asked Mrs. Atkinson if she
understood that she would have no future claim against IHC even
if the child's condition worsened, and she said she did. (Tr.
at 2.) Significantly, the Atkinsons allege only Mr. Atkinson's near illiteracy, avoiding the question whether Mrs.
Atkinson was truthful when she said she understood. Mr.
Atkinson was able to answer oral questions, showing his personal understanding of the questions asked. (Tr. at 3-4.)
5

Mrs. Atkinson, aged 16, was a married woman, willing
to give birth and willing to apply for and accept the courtordered guardianship (with her husband) of her child.

She is

the beneficiary of years of effort by women to be recognized as
persons, not chattel, under the law.8
ignore laws according rights to women.

The Court s;hould not
This is not the case

nor the time to reverse statute and precedent.

The Atkinsons1

allegations about age and illiteracy are not persuasive and do
not justify rehearing.
No one ever questioned the Atkinsons' right as parents to keep their child, nor have there been any allegations
of their inability to serve as his parents and his legal guardians or to provide his daily nurture.

Had there been no injury

to their child, the law would have had no concern with his
care, unless they violated child support or criminal statutes.
The law permits young and old parents to raise their
children; it should not, because of the Atkinsons1 age, favor
them with relief from a settlement they supported in court.
The Atkinsons should not benefit from age discrimination.

The

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 63-3-1 et seq.
9

Indeed, if persons of their respective ages had had a
child born out of wedlock, they could have decided whether to
marry, whether to place the child for adoption (terminating all
parental rights) or whether one or the other would retain
custody with the possibility of receiving support from and
according visitation to the other.
6

Atkinsons cannot be permitted to pick and choose their rights,
responsibilities and competencies.
Moreover, the Atkinsons have failed to show any
causal connection between their ages or their alleged illiteracy and the value of the settlement; there is no evidence that,
had they been older or more literate, the settlement would have
been larger or different.

There is no evidence that the

settlement itself is inadequate or unreasonable or could have
been so discerned or proven.
2.

The Atkinsons Were Advised As They Chose>
Mr. Atkinson's father, George Atkinson, described

himself as a union negotiator, chosen to negotiate on behalf of
his union with a major mining corporation.

He offered a propo-

sal of settlement which was rejected by IHC.

The fact that the

Atkinsons did not hold out for the terms of George Atkinson's
alternative proposal does not mean that they failed to follow
George Atkinson's advice or did not have its benefit.
Even the most experienced and competent of lawyers,
arbiters and negotiators win some cases and lose others. The
fact that George Atkinson's proposal did not prevail does not
mean that a different proposal was unfair or fraudulent.

Most

negotiators ask for more than they expect; it is only speculation when the Atkinsons now argue they acted without George
Atkinson's advice because his views did not prevail.

7

No one has reviewed (and no one needs to review) the
reasonableness of the position George Atkinson urged during
negotiations; no one has an obligation to prove that a rejected
proposal was fair or reasonable or should have been imposed by
a court.

The fact that another proposal was made does not make

that proposal fair, better or worse than the settlement approved by the Court.
To attempt to build a case of fraud in ci courtapproved settlement on the fact that some other proposal was
not accepted is to engage in chimera.

No one knows or can

establish what might have occurred had the Atkinsons refused
any settlement other than that proposed by George Atkinson.
IHC refused his terms and has no burden to show why it did not
yield to them.
No one knows at what point a refusal to compromise
might have required court action by the Atkinsons.

A jury

might or might not have awarded $900,000 to their child.

No

one knows, and no one can know because there is no record of
what might have been if.

The Atkinsons1 argument requires the

Court to indulge in speculation; that is improper in the judicial process.
3.

The Atkinsons Chose Not to Be Represented by Counsel«
IHC agrees with the position of Respondents Stephen

G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & Reading in their response to
the petition for rehearing.

The Atkinsons consulted an attor-

8

ney but chose not to retain one. They were, with the aid of
themselves and Mr. Atkinson's father, able to get approximately
$1 million; there is no evidence that they might have gotten
another sum otherwise.

They might have gotten less and could

have incurred large legal fees.
IHC also agrees that the Atkinsons have no claim of
legal malpractice.

An attorney representing one party when the

other side chooses to appear pro se should be under no obligation to assist the pro se opponent as the Atkinsons urge.
4.

The Probate Court Made a Proper Determination.
The Atkinsons' abdication of responsibility —

their

argument that they relied on the judge to be sure things were
fair —

raises several considerations.

The first is that the

Atkinsons, after conversing with an unidentified attorney, felt
no need to sue because a settlement had been offered to them.
The Atkinsons chose whether to offer the settlement for confirmation; they asked to be appointed guardians without bond for
that purpose.

(R. 421.)

Their choices indicate their exercise

of judgment and responsibility.

After negotiating for a guar-

anteed $900,000, it is disingenuous for them now to claim that
they relied on the judge to protect their child.
But, even if the Atkinsons did rely on the court,
there is no evidence that their reliance on the court was
misplaced, nor is there any evidence to show that the probate
judge was concerned with anything other than the child's prot-

9

ection.

The fact that the judge required the Atkinsons to post

bond and file reports evidences the propriety and breadth of
the judge's concern for the child.

The Atkinsons1 reliance on

the judge does not require rehearing or reopening of the
settlement.

The Atkinsons have no proof that the settlement

should not have been approved.
5.

Questioning the Judge Creates Serious Problems? of Legal and

Judicial Policy*
Judge Fishier's resignation from the bench provided
the parties with the unusual opportunity to obtain the affidavit and deposition of a judge who sat on a case.

Although

some situations exist in which judges have been questioned
about their judicial tenure (e.g., when criminal charges have
been filed), IHC respectfully submits that it is a dangerous
precedent to permit a disgruntled litigant to question a judge
as part of an appeal or a collateral attack on a judgment.

The

judicial process provides litigants with an appellate procedure
and prescribed forms of collateral attack by rule* and statute.
To permit a judge —
bench —

even one no longer active on the

to be questioned about the judicial process creates a

sharp departure in legal proceedings and may be the precursor
of naming judges as defendants and seeking to find them liable
for a new claim of judicial malpractice.

Judicial decisions

should be challenged under settled principles of law and judicial review, not on the recollections of judges about the

10

questions they asked or the thoughts they may have had in
exercising their powers and applying their discretion.

Such a

departure in the judicial process should not develop from
happenstance.

A policy decision to modify the appellate

process should arise from judicial rule or legislative enactment; a constitutional amendment may be required.
Despite the problems inherent in examining judicial
memories, Judge Fishier's deposition and the affidavit give no
reason why rehearing should be granted or why, ultimately,
anyone should conclude that the settlement accepted by the
Atkinsons for their child was not fair.

Judge Fishierfs testi-

mony shows his proper judicial behavior with no violation of
legal standard.
6.

The Affidavit of a Psychologist Should Carry No Weight.
The affidavit of Richard King Mower offered by the

Atkinsons in support of their petition should have no place in
these proceedings.

An attempt to raise a factual issue on a

petition for rehearing is virtually unprecedented and certainly
untimely.

Moreover, the content of the affidavit offers

nothing to assist the Court.

It consists of quotations from

court and deposition testimony and from this Court's decision,
which Mr. Mower attempts to interpret.
Research has yielded no precedent in which a psychologist's analysis of a portion of the record has been
substituted for the analysis of a judicial panel on a petition

11

for rehearing.

The Atkinsons nowhere establish why Mr, Mower's

inconclusive interpretation should be given deference or why
his affidavit should be recognized by the Court on rehearing.
Even if the Atkinsons1 statements were to be interpreted as Mr. Mower suggests and even if Mr. Mower is accurate
that a juror could join him or oppose him on the s;ubjects about
which he opines, his views fail to demonstrate a triable issue
as to the underlying propriety of the settlement.

In short,

his statements, even if accepted as the views of an expert in
psychology, fall far short of establishing anything with enough
legal merit to justify further proceedings by this Court.

His

affidavit does not show any impropriety in the summary judgment decision or in this Court's unanimous affirming opinion.
Litigants should not be permitted to create or offer
new facts or new disputes on a petition for rehearing, as the
Atkinsons attempt with the Mower affidavit; this is another
distortion of the appellate procedure and a distortion of the
concept of "record".

It is a distortion which cannot be per-

mitted without the approval of judicial rulemaking, legislative
enactment or constitutional amendment.

The judicial and appel-

late process should not so easily fall prey to untimely though
imaginative efforts of counsel.
7.

There Is No Meritorious Constitutional Claim.
Neither Mr. Mower's inconclusive views about the

Atkinsons' statements nor his lay analysis of judicial reason-

12

ing nor anything else argued by the Atkinsons creates a constitutional issue at this untimely juncture.

The standards for

granting summary judgment are clear and were properly recognized by this Court in affirming the trial court.

Summary

judgment has long been recognized as a proper and constitutional means of resolving litigation, in no manner creating a
denial of constitutional right to jury trial.

Constitutional

questions do not shine from the murky analysis and arguments of
the Petitioners.
8.

Valid Justifications for Summary Judgment Remain Unscathed,
The Atkinsons1 petition for rehearing purports to

raise three issues about the case, none of which is valid, as
demonstrated.

The Atkinsons do not attack the numerous grounds

for summary judgment which were previously argued and which
still justify this Court's unanimous decision.

The Atkinsons1

attack on the settlement is barred by all possible limitations
periods pertaining to medical malpractice claims.
Code Ann. §§ 78-14-3(29), 78-14-8, 78-14-4(1).

See Utah

Their fraud and

misrepresentation claims, insofar as they may be construed as
separate from the underlying medical/injury claim, are barred
by a three-year limitation period.
26(3).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-

Their fraud and misrepresentation claims are further

barred by their refusal to rescind the settlement agreement —
they have received and continue to retain its benefits.

The

Atkinson's claims were previously settled in open court, so

13

this action is collaterally estopped.

Searle Bros, v. Searle,

588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), see also Robertson v. Campbell. 674
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983); Berrv v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246 (Utah App.
1987).
The evidence is uncontradicted that the Atkinsons
refused an offer at no charge to have the child independently
evaluated out of state. In open court, the Atkinsons acknowledged that their child had brain damage.

In open court,

Mrs. Atkinson acknowledged that by settling they could not
again claim against IHC, even if the child's condition worsened.

The release filed in open court recites the financial

provisions of the settlement and also states that the extent
and permanence of damage to the child may not be known.

The

parents acknowledged in open court that they believed their
child had a claim, and Mr. Atkinson responded coherently when
the $900,000 amount of the settlement was mentioned by the
probate judge.

All of these factors support summary judgment

against the Atkinsons.
There is no merit to any claim or argument by the
Atkinsons to invalidate summary judgment against them; ample
grounds for summary judgment exist and persist even against the
speculative reasons the petitioners offer for reargument.
CONCLUSION
It is the mark of a competent and qualified judiciary
that it attends carefully to allegations of error.

14

However, a

mere allegation of error supported by purported facts raised
post-appeal and alleged disputes over facts insufficient to
prove the merits of an underlying claim do not justify reargument.

The Atkinsons1 petition for reargument lacks merit and

should be denied.

IHC seeks such other and further relief,

including costs, as may be just and proper.
Dated:

September 27, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
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By:

B. Llqyd pbelman
David B. Erickson
M. Karlynn Hinman
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents IHC Hospitals,
Inc., a/k/a Intermountain
Health Care
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney for respondent IHC Hospitals, Inc. a/k/a Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc.
hereby certifies that on September 27, 1990, she caused the
foregoing IHC Hospitals, Inc.'s Brief Opposing Petition for
Rehearing to be served on all of the parties by mailing copies
thereof by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to
their attorneys, as follows:
Paul
Ray,
P.O.
Salt

S. Felt
Quinney & Nebeker
Box 45385
Lake City, Utah 84145

Carman Kipp
Kipp & Christian
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Robert J. DeBry
Dale F. Gardiner
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

is 37

Dated this Cx (

day of September, 1990.

'is/u.
M. Karlynn Hinman
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